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Boba Fett, Bounty Hunters, and the
Supreme Court’s Viking River
Decision:
A New Hope
Imre S. Szalai
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court recently issued a
fractured decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142
S. Ct. 1906 (June 15, 2022), a classic David v. Goliath clash
between a worker and employer. Can arbitration agreements be
used to eliminate group or representative actions brought against
employers, where the plaintiff worker is serving as a bounty
hunter for the State? Although the majority clearly holds that a
worker’s individual claims must be sent to arbitration pursuant
to a predispute arbitration agreement, the splintered opinions
leave some uncertainty regarding what happens to the
representative claims of the other workers. Using the Star Wars
universe, this Article clarifies and critiques flaws in the Court’s
ruling. The decision provides a new hope and blueprint for
protecting the rights of workers and consumers around the
country.



Professor Szalai, a Star Wars fan, is the Judge John D. Wessel Distinguished
Professor of Social Justice at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law,
where he teaches padawans about dispute resolution. He serves as an
arbitrator, and he has published books and articles about the history and
development of arbitration. He would like to thank the editors of the
Washington and Lee Law Review for their deep engagement with the article
and assistance with editing. May the Force be with them!
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INTRODUCTION: A LONG TIME AGO . . . (CUE THE STAR WARS
MAIN THEME MUSIC)
Arbitration existed before the founding of our country,
and like the Force, arbitration has spread throughout every
corner of our galaxy. Through arbitration, parties agree to
submit their disputes to a private decision maker instead of a
court, and arbitration agreements can be found in connection
with all types of transactions.1 Arbitration can have a Light
Side, with the potential for speed, efficiency, low costs, and the
use of experts serving as adjudicators.2 But at the same time,
there can be a Dark Side, where parties may abuse arbitration
as a way to suppress legitimate claims. Arbitration can
sometimes involve limited, one-sided procedures designed to
favor a stronger party, and arbitration’s confidentiality and
privacy can help conceal wrongdoing.3
1. MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:4 (3d
ed. 2022).
2. Id.
3. Id.; Bragg v. Linden Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (“Taken together, [the harsh terms in the arbitration clause]
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One important episode in this saga regarding arbitration
has involved “Class Action Wars.” Corporate America and the
Supreme Court seem determined to dismantle the class action
procedural device,4 and arbitration has been used like
Chewbacca’s bowcaster weapon to destroy class actions. An
individual arbitration agreement, whereby an individual
consumer or worker agrees to arbitrate his or her dispute with
the company in a bilateral or one-on-one proceeding, has been
used successfully to date to eliminate the threat of class actions
or collective proceedings. In a series of decisions, the Supreme
Court has held that class actions are incompatible with
arbitration, and an individual arbitration agreement can, in
effect, end the prosecution of a class action filed in court.5 An
individual consumer or employee who files a class action in court
against a company will quickly have the class action dismissed
if the consumer or employee is bound by an arbitration clause.6
Class or collective actions, like the Jedi, seem at times to be
going extinct.
However, in California, which tends to be the wild, wild
west or Tatooine of arbitration law with its cutting-edge
arbitration developments, a bounty hunter appeared who could
bring balance to the Class Action Wars: California’s Private
Attorneys General Act, more commonly known as PAGA.7

demonstrate that the arbitration clause is not designed to provide [consumers]
an effective means of resolving disputes with [the company]. Rather, it is a
one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations, in [the
company’s] favor.”).
4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252 (2013)
(Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“To a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness
of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”).
5. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011)
(the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California rule that a class waiver in
an arbitration clause is unconscionable because the state rule “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress”) (citations omitted); Am. Express, 570 U.S. at 239
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act does not permit courts to invalidate
a class waiver where the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal
claim exceeds potential recovery).
6. See, e.g., Carrera Chapple v. Ancestry.com Operations Inc., No.
20CV1456-LAB (DEB), 2020 WL 5847552, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020)
(dismissing a class action due to a class waiver in an arbitration clause).
7. See generally Cal. Lab. Code § 2698.
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Through PAGA, an aggrieved worker can become like Boba
Fett, the most legendary, feared bounty hunter in the Star Wars
galaxy. This Boba Fett worker, in the name of the State of
California, can pursue an employer and collect penalties for the
employer’s violations of California’s labor code, even if the
violations involve other co-workers.8 These PAGA proceedings
resemble to some degree a representative or group action of the
Rebel Alliance, while the Empire of corporate America would
prefer to divide and conquer so that workers can only bring
individual claims. With PAGA actions, seventy-five percent of
the penalties collected belong to the State, with twenty-five
percent of the penalties going to workers like a bounty.9 The
theory behind PAGA is that the State of California, through its
attorney general or state agencies, could bring these actions
directly against employers who are violating the labor code, but
because of limited resources and the size of California’s
workforce, the State has bestowed this power on private bounty
hunter workers who can assist with enforcing the labor code.10
For several years, PAGA has been “the Way” to enforce
California’s labor code.11 In the larger Class Action Wars, PAGA
enables workers to avoid the harshness of individual arbitration
agreements and seek collective remedies as bounty hunters for
the State. The California Supreme Court has valiantly
attempted to shield this process from federal preemption by
holding that purported waivers of representative PAGA claims
are unenforceable under California law.12 Thousands of bounty
hunters as a result have flooded California courts each year
8. Id. § 2699(g) (“[A]n aggrieved employee may recover [a] civil
penalty . . . in a civil action . . . filed on behalf of himself or herself and other
current or former employees against whom one or more of the alleged
violations was committed.”).
9. Id. § 2699(i).
10. Mattew J. Goodman, The Private Attorney General Act: How to
Manage the Unmanageable, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 413, 414 (“PAGA was
enacted as a response to the growing disparity between California’s large labor
force and the increasingly finite staff of the state’s enforcement agencies.”).
11. “This is the Way” is commonly used in Mandalorian culture to refer
to their belief system. Boba Fett was indoctrinated in the ways of the
Mandalorians, a clan in the Star Wars universe.
12. See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129,
388–89 (Cal. 2014) (holding that PAGA claims do not interfere with the
Federal Arbitration Act because the claims, brought on behalf of the
government, were outside the scope of the federal statute).
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through PAGA, and the rise in power of these bounty hunters
set the stage for a galactic battle in the United States Supreme
Court.13 While California’s PAGA allows for these
representative actions on behalf of the State with a worker
serving as a bounty hunter, several United States Supreme
Court rulings under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) require
individual actions through bilateral arbitration.14 If a PAGA
bounty hunter was bound by an arbitration clause, what should
happen? Would Boba Fett survive the Sarlaac?15
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE VIKING RIVER LITIGATION AND THE
SUPREME COURT’S CERT GRANT: “I’VE GOT A BAD FEELING
ABOUT THIS”16

Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking
River Cruises, Inc., and an arbitration clause was part of her
hiring.17 Upon leaving the company, she sued Viking River in
court for failing to pay her final wages on time.18 In addition to
her individual claims, she became like Boba Fett and asserted,
in the name of the State of California through PAGA, claims
suffered by other coworkers, such as claims regarding minimum
wage, overtime payments, meal periods, and rest periods in
violation of California’s labor code. When Viking River sought to
compel arbitration of Ms. Moriana’s individual claim and
dismissal of her representative PAGA claims, the lower court
and appellate court denied Viking River’s motion to compel

13. See, e.g., Cameron Molis, Curbing Concepcion: How States Can Ease
the Strain of Predispute Arbitration to Counter Corporate Abusers, 24 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 430 (2021) (noting that “members of the business
community [have] emphasized the ‘deluge’ of PAGA claims”).
14. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)
(FAA prohibits states from conditioning the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on the availability of class-wide procedures).
15. In Return of the Jedi, Boba Fett appears to die when he falls into the
Great Pit of Carkoon containing the Sarlaac beast. STAR WARS: EPISODE VI –
RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983).
16. A character says something to this effect in every Star Wars movie.
17. The facts set forth in this paragraph are taken from the majority
opinion in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1915–17
(June 15, 2022).
18. Id.
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arbitration.19 Both courts held that waivers of PAGA claims
were contrary to state policy, and PAGA claims cannot be split
into arbitrable individual claims and non-arbitrable
“representative” claims.20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if these rulings were consistent with the FAA. With
a long track record of the United States Supreme Court
overruling California decisions involving arbitration,21 workers
in California must have had a bad feeling about the Court’s
grant of certiorari.
II.

YODA: “DIVIDED THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ARE”

A fractured decision the Justices issued in Viking River
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, with a majority opinion, a partial
concurrence, a full concurrence, and a dissent. One could see the
possibility of this divided decision during oral argument when it
became apparent that the Justices were struggling to
conceptualize or disagreed on the nature of a PAGA suit. For
example, should PAGA be viewed primarily as a joinder
mechanism, whereby the claims of multiple workers are joined
together in one proceeding? If PAGA is understood as merely a
joinder tool of multiple parties, the employer should win before
the Supreme Court because arbitration is viewed as
incompatible with collective actions, and through arbitration, it
is understood that one can give up procedural rules available in
court like joinder rules. Should PAGA be understood as an
action brought on behalf of and belonging to the State? If we
view the workers as bounty hunters and the State of California
as the real party in interest, then the workers should win
because the State is not a party to or blocked by an arbitration
clause. If the Court conceptualizes PAGA as something like a
claim for substantive penalties, like a claim for punitive
damages or treble damages, whereby the plaintiff can seek
penalties for workplace violations, then perhaps the workers
19. See Moriana v. Viking River Cruises, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
6045, at *6.
20. Id. at *5.
21. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47 (2015); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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should also win. Arbitration is not supposed to undermine the
vindication of substantive rights, like a claim for damages or
penalties. Qui-Gon Jinn wisely recognized in The Phantom
Menace, “Your focus determines your reality,” and Obi-Wan
Kenobi in Return of Jedi observed that “many of the truths we
cling to depend greatly on our own point of view.”22 Similarly,
how the Justices conceptualized PAGA would likely determine
how the Justices applied the FAA to this case.
A five-Justice majority opinion written by Justice Alito
found that pursuant to the FAA, an individual worker who is
trying to serve as a Boba Fett bounty hunter under PAGA can
be compelled to arbitrate, in a one-on-one arbitration
proceeding, his or her individual claims against the employer.23
Earlier Supreme Court decisions, like AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, had held that the FAA can operate like the Death
Star and overshadow and annihilate any state law that
threatens fundamental attributes of arbitration.24 The majority
in Viking River, relying on such precedent, viewed the
“freeform” joinder of claims allowed under PAGA as
incompatible with the “basic” nature of arbitration, which the
Court considered as “individualized and informal.”25 In other
words, state law cannot condition arbitration on the availability
of broad, procedural joinder rules. Thus, the worker’s individual
claims could be sent to one-on-one arbitration, and state law
could not be used to impose the joinder of the claims of others in
arbitration. Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh and
Chief Justice Roberts, wrote a separate opinion and narrowly

22. STAR WARS: EPISODE I – THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilm 1999); STAR
WARS: EPISODE VI – RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983).
23. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1924–25.
24. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
25. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1918, 1921. Notice that the majority
assumed arbitration involves “individualized and informal” proceedings, as if
arbitration proceedings were frozen in carbonite a long time ago. But such an
assumption is not necessarily correct. Arbitration should not be viewed as a
homogeneous, simple, informal process. Arbitration can involve rich, varied,
complex proceedings. The American Arbitration Association, a leading arbitral
association, has more than two hundred sets of archived and active rules on
its website, including rules for large, complex commercial disputes. See
Archived Rules, AM. ARB. ASSOC., https://perma.cc/RR6C-6CXM (last visited
June 17, 2022); Active Rules, AM. ARB. ASSOC., https://perma.cc/8YKL-8CCV
(last visited June 17, 2022).
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agreed with the majority that state law cannot condition the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of
complex joinder or aggregation rules.26 As a result, Ms. Moriana
would have to submit her individual claims to an arbitrator.
Spoiler Alert! Boba Fett appears to meet his demise in the
Great Pit of Carkoon at the beginning of Return of the Jedi.27
However, after years of speculation, Star Wars fandom learns in
the Book of Boba Fett that the galaxy’s preeminent bounty
hunter narrowly escapes the pit to live another day.28 Similarly,
with Justice Alito’s majority opinion, it looked like California’s
workers would be doomed and sent to the pit of arbitration. But
PAGA’s bounty hunters seem to be wearing impenetrable
Mandalorian armor like Boba Fett’s. In Section IV of the
majority’s opinion, the Court suggests that “non-individual
claims,” the representative PAGA claims belonging to the State
and covering the other workers, could possibly remain in court,
as long as state law provides a mechanism and standing for the
enforcement of these non-individual claims.29 Holy Hutt! Bounty
hunters may continue to hunt in California under PAGA as well
as in other states that enact similar legislation! However,
Justice Alito thought that current California state law provides
no mechanism or standing for the PAGA representative claims
to proceed in court if Ms. Moriana’s individual claims are
dismissed to arbitration.30 According to Justice Alito’s
interpretation of California law, Ms. Moriana lacks statutory
standing under PAGA to pursue the representative claims, and
thus, these representative claims would have to be dismissed.31
Justice Sotomayor, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a
separate concurrence amplifying that California retains its
sovereignty to use private bounty hunters to enforce California’s
labor code.32 She recognizes that Justice Alito may be wrong
with his conclusion regarding statutory standing under current
26. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1926 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kavanaugh, J.).
27. STAR WARS: EPISODE VI - RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983).
28. The Book of Boba Fett (Lucasfilm 2021).
29. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1924–25.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1925 (June 15,
2022) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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California law, and if so, California courts could step in and
allow the representative PAGA claims to proceed in court.33 And
even if Justice Alito is correct, Justice Sotomayor recognizes the
California legislature may step in and modify statutory
standing to allow for such court proceedings.34 Justices Barrett
and Kavanaugh and Chief Justice Roberts apparently are not
fans of Boba Fett, and they notably did not join this Section IV
of the opinion regarding the survival of the bounty hunter claims
under PAGA.35
Justice Thomas issued a dissenting opinion based on his
long-held view that the FAA should not control in state court at
all.36
III. JUSTICE ALITO’S JEDI MIND TRICK IN VIKING RIVER
In a footnote in the Viking River decision regarding the
arbitrability of statutory claims, Justice Alito attempts to
whitewash almost forty decades of bad precedent with verbal
gymnastics akin to a Jedi mind trick.37 The FAA was never
intended to cover statutory disputes; instead, the FAA was
designed for contractual, commercial disputes.38 If one carefully
examines the FAA’s text, the FAA’s coverage is limited to
written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract.”39
The arbitrability of statutory claims can be traced back in
part to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1926 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kavanaugh, J.).
36. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1919 n.4. The Jedi mind trick made its first
appearance in Star Wars: Episode IV- A New Hope (Lucasfilm 1977), when Obi
-Wan Kenobi convinces Stormtroopers that “[t]hese are not the droids you’re
looking for.” To paraphrase Jabba in Star Wars: Episode VI - Return of the Jedi
(Lucasfilm 1983), “Your mind powers will not work on me, [Justice Alito.]”
38. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 99, 106 (2006) (stating that the FAA was intended only “to
provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants parties presumed to be of approximately equal bargaining strength”).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.40 In Mitsubishi, the Court
misread section 2 of the FAA, the FAA’s core provision, and as a
result, the Court radically transformed and expanded the
meaning of the statute.41 In Mitsubishi, the Court selectively
quotes from section 2 as follows:
We do not agree, for we find no warrant in the Arbitration
Act for implying in every contract within its ken a
presumption against arbitration of statutory claims. The
Act’s centerpiece provision makes a written agreement to
arbitrate “in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9
U.S.C. § 2.42

The Court’s quotation of section 2 in Mitsubishi leaves out
crucial, limiting language. The Court in Mitsubishi, through the
use of a cleverly-placed ellipsis, avoids quoting the key
limitation in the FAA providing that disputes must “aris[e] out
of such contract” in order to be covered by the FAA.43 California’s
labor code provides statutory protections, such as required meal
and rest breaks for workers.44 One’s right to sue for these statemandated meal or rest breaks is not dependent upon a contract,
and instead, such rights arise from, are guaranteed by, and are
rooted in California’s Labor Code.45 Similarly, someone’s right
to be free from bodily harm, assault, or discrimination is
thankfully not dependent upon a contract; instead, such rights
are rooted in and depend on tort laws and civil rights laws. The
FAA was drafted to cover commercial, contractual disputes, not
statutory claims that can be asserted without reference to a
contract.46 The full text of the FAA, omitted and ignored by the
40. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
41. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625.
42. Id.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract” are fully binding).
44. Perez v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Asilomar, Inc., 2022 WL 411422, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2022) (“California law requires an employer to provide
its non-exempt employees with a thirty-minute meal period for every five
hours of work.”) (citing Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512).
45. Id.
46. See infra note 55.
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Court in Mitsubishi, does not support the expansive
arbitrability of statutory claims.47
Over the years, the Supreme Court has deflected any
scrutiny of the FAA’s text and scrutiny of Mitsubishi’s
cleverly-placed ellipsis by creating an arbitrability test
examining the substantive law to be arbitrated. In other words,
to determine whether a particular claim can be arbitrated,
courts examine the substantive law forming the basis for the
underlying dispute, not the FAA.48 The strong presumption is
that every type of claim can now be arbitrated under the FAA,
and the burden is on the party opposing arbitrability to show
that the legislature intended to preserve the right to litigate for
a particular claim.49 “[S]uch an intent ‘will be deducible from
[the statute’s] text or legislative history, . . . or from an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying
purposes.”50
Justice Alito, in a footnote in Viking River, attempts to
cover up Mitsubishi’s error by providing a new justification for
the arbitrability of statutory claims.51 Relying on a Supreme
Court opinion discussing due process standards for personal
jurisdiction, Justice Alito equates the phrase “arise out of” in the
FAA with a lenient “but-for” causation test.52 If the underlying
substantive claim would not have happened, but-for the
contract, the claim arises from that contract according to Justice
Alito.53 If two parties have a relationship and enter into a
contract containing an arbitration clause, Justice Alito’s test is
so expansive that virtually every claim subsequently arising
47. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, J.) (“The plain language of [the FAA] . . . does not encompass a claim
arising under [statutory] law. . . . Nothing in the text of the [FAA], nor its
legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the
arbitration of any statutory claims.”).
48. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991) (examining the text, history, and purpose of a statute to determine if
claims under the statute may be subject to arbitration under the FAA).
49. Id.
50. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)
(citations omitted).
51. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1919 n.4.
52. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct.
1017, 1026 (2021)).
53. Id.
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between the parties could be said to be the result of or arise out
of the contract. Under this broad test, a dispute may have
absolutely nothing to do with the contract, but still “arise out of”
the contract and be covered by the FAA as long as the claim
satisfies a lenient but-for causation test.
Such a but-for causation test is broad and aimless, like a
Stormtrooper with horrible aim; this test fails to impose any
practical, real limits. Arbitration agreements will only exist if
there is a pre-existing relationship between the parties, and
with a lenient but-for causation test, any subsequent claim
between the parties can be easily traced back to the prior
relationship and agreement. For example, if I were not hired
(but-for that employment relationship or entering into that
initial employment contract), I would never have a
discrimination claim against my employer. If I were not hired
(but-for that employment relationship or entering into that
initial employment contract), I would never be cheated out of my
break or mealtimes by my manager. The use of a but-for test in
this context where the parties have a prior agreement would in
effect cover virtually every possible claim such that the test
becomes meaningless and really no test at all.
In the same decision quoted by Justice Alito, Justice
Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment and critical of the but-for test:
As every first year law student learns, a but-for causation
test isn’t the most demanding. At a high level of abstraction,
one might say any event in the world would not have
happened “but for” events far and long removed.54

A more meaningful test, one with real limits, would conclude
that a claim arises out of an agreement if the claim relies on the
terms of the agreement, and then such contractual claims would
be fully consistent with the original history of the FAA’s
enactment.55 Justice Alito’s footnote was a weak Jedi mind trick
54. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Thomas,
J.).
55. Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements
for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions,
or Commerce Among the States or Territories or With Foreign Nations: Joint
Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the
Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (the FAA covers “ordinary, everyday trade
disputes,” and “it is for them that this legislation is proposed”); id. (FAA covers
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to attempt to reconcile the FAA’s text with several decades of
flawed, expansive interpretations by the Court.56 This footnote
about the scope of arbitrability under the FAA is unnecessary
for the Court’s holding in Viking River and should be treated as
dicta going forward.
IV. A STARDUST BLUEPRINT FOR PRESERVING SOVEREIGNTY
AND REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS
The Viking River case raises constitutional problems, and
one can view this case through the lens of federalism and state
sovereignty. Section IV of the Court’s opinion recognizes the
possibility of the non-individual, representative PAGA claims
remaining in court.57 Under the majority’s view, the preemptive
shadow of the Death Star FAA is limited and does not reach far
enough to cover these representative PAGA claims.58
Unfortunately, the majority’s opinion did not provide much
explanation or support for this limitation. Below is a sketch of a
Stardust blueprint59 to help support the idea that the Death
Star FAA cannot block the assertion of representative PAGA
claims in court.
“States possess broad authority under their police powers
to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers
within the State.”60 By enacting its labor code and PAGA,
California is using its sovereign police powers to regulate
commercial disputes arising in interstate commerce, such as a “farmer who
will sell his carload of potatoes, from Wyoming, to a dealer in the State of New
Jersey”); id. at 30-31 (arbitration reduces “business litigation” and encourages
“business men” to settle their “business differences”); id. at 31 (adoption of the
FAA is necessary to facilitate the resolution of disputes “arising in
[merchants’] daily business transactions”).
56. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has abandoned all pretense
of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”).
57. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1924–1925.
58. Id.
59. In Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (Lucasfilm 2016), the blueprints for
the Death Star were known by the code name Stardust, and such blueprints
were ultimately used to destroy the Death Star in Star Wars: Episode IV- A
New Hope (Lucasfilm 1977). Stay on target! RIP, Gold Five.
60. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (citation
omitted).
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primary conduct at the workplace, such as the requirement of
providing meal and rest breaks for workers. How a State
regulates the enforcement of its own laws is generally within the
power of each State.61 The California legislature designed and
adopted PAGA’s mechanisms, whereby a worker serves as the
State’s proxy, as appropriate for enforcement of the State’s labor
code. The majority in Section IV was correct in not interpreting
the FAA in an expansive manner to override PAGA. A
fundamental reason why the majority was correct - although
this reason is left largely unspoken in the Court’s opinion, is that
federal law should not be used to deprive States of sovereign
authority over the enforcement of state-created rights.62
If Congress desires to flex its constitutional powers,
perhaps its Commerce Clause powers, to override state
sovereignty, basic principles of federalism require that Congress
“must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the [federal] statute.”63 However, nothing in the
FAA’s text makes it “unmistakably clear” that Congress
intended to displace state sovereignty to enforce state-created
labor rights. The text of the FAA relied on by the employer
Viking River refers exclusively, and in an unmistakably clear
manner, to federal courts, federal jurisdiction, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, not state courts all.64 In fact, “[t]he
61. See Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151,
158 (1931) (how “rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a
subject of state regulation and control”).
62. See In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407–08 (1871) (“How [the
federal government’s and state governments’] respective laws shall be enacted;
how they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what
officers . . . are matters subject to their own control, and in the regulation of
which neither can interfere with the other.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (recognizing that since “the police power
is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign,” “smaller
governments closer to the governed” generally exercise police powers and
regulate “the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives”).
63. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
64. Viking River’s opening brief relies on sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA
as the basis for arbitration, and the Court has recognized these provisions are
“integral parts of a whole.” New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 538 (2019)
(citation omitted). These provisions apply solely in federal courts. See, e.g., 9
U.S.C. § 3 (referring to “courts of the United States”); 9 U.S.C. § 4 (referring to
the “United States district court,” Title 28 of the United States Code, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it
reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration.”65 In light of these constitutional concerns
regarding federal interference with state sovereignty, the Court
in Section IV was correct to recognize that the FAA does not
preempt or block the assertion of California’s representative
PAGA claims in court.
If the Court in Viking River would have held that the FAA
somehow blocks representative PAGA claims, such a ruling
would undermine political accountability within our federalist
system. In this system, where each State retains its own
sovereignty, “[t]he Framers thus ensured that powers which ‘in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people’ were held by governments more local
and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.”66 The
State of California is ultimately responsible for developing its
own Labor Code and establishing how this code is to be enforced,
and the people of California must be able to hold their own state
representatives accountable for carrying out these labor
policies. However, if Congress can easily undermine how a State
enforces state-created rights, if the FAA would block the
enforcement of representative PAGA claims in court, California
would lose control and accountability over its own labor laws.67
Allowing each sovereign State the freedom to experiment with
how its own state-created rights are enforced helps promote the
values of federalism and spurs innovation among the States to
regulate dispute resolution in different, creative ways.68

65. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
66. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012)
(quoting The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison)).
67. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (explaining
that “a state government’s responsibility to represent and be accountable to
the citizens of the State” is a fundamental component of a State’s Tenth
Amendment sovereignty); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir.
1997) (asserting that the Tenth Amendment helps promote accountability to
the electorate).
68. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 121
(2013) (arguing that sacrificing the uniformity value of broad FAA preemption
would promote federalism values in connection with dispute resolution and
the enforcement of rights).
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Justice Thomas’ dissent in Viking River is consistent with
these views regarding federalism and respect for the sovereignty
of each State.69 In a galaxy far, far away, when the FAA was
first enacted during the 1920s, it was clear that the FAA was
supposed to govern solely in federal courts.70 The late Professor
Ian Macneil wrote a detailed book setting forth numerous
arguments why the FAA applies solely in federal court, such as
the FAA’s structure as a unitary, comprehensive statute;71 the
statute’s explicit language referring to the Federal courts;72 the
legislative history;73 and the universal understanding at the
time of the FAA’s enactment that arbitration laws were
procedural.74 The FAA was never designed to encroach on state
sovereignty.75
Another major reason supporting the majority’s decision in
Section IV is that one can conceptualize the real party in
interest here as the State of California.76 The Supreme Court’s
prior decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,77 is instructive and
69. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1926 (2022)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
71. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 105–07 (1992) (arguing that given
the “constant reference to federal courts throughout the act,” Congress likely
intended to enact “an integrated statute, either applicable in its entirety to
any given proceeding in any given court or not at all.”).
72. Id. at 106–07.
73. See id. at 111–19; see also H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924) (“Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a
question of procedure to be determined by the law court in which the
proceeding is brought, and not one of substantive law to be determined by the
law of the forum in which the contract is made.”).
74. See MACNEIL, supra note 71, at 109–11 (asserting that it was
well-known that the enforceability of an arbitration agreement was a question
of procedure); see also Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N. E. 288, 290
(N.Y. 1921) (“Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be
settled. It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow.”).
75. See Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act
Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 118 (2016) (“[T]he FAA
was never intended to apply in state courts.”).
76. See Contreras v. Super. Ct., 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 746 (Cal. Ct. App.
2021) (“Every PAGA claim is a dispute between an employer and the state.”
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
77. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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helps support the Court’s reasoning in Section IV, although
none of the different opinions in Viking River even mention
Waffle House. The representative claims at issue in Viking River
do not involve an adjudication of the substantive contractual
rights belonging to a worker or private party; such a dispute can
generally be subject to a broad, pre-dispute arbitration clause.
Instead, this case involves the collection, on behalf of the State
of California, of civil penalties that are mainly paid to the State’s
treasury for violations of statutory duties, such as mandatory
meal and rest breaks, imposed by the State’s labor code. Cal.
Lab. Code § 2699.78 In Waffle House, the EEOC brought an
action on behalf of an individual worker, and the Court held that
an arbitration agreement between the worker and employer did
not bar such an action by the EEOC.79 PAGA actions are instead
brought on behalf of the State of California.80 Just like the
EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement at issue in
Waffle House, the State of California is not a party to arbitration
agreements between California workers and their employers.
The Waffle House case supports the majority’s reasoning in
Section IV.81
The FAA has been used over time to override and displace
state sovereignty and block the ability of victims to access the
78. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1913–15 (2022).
79. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294 (asserting that when the EEOC is
a nonparty to an arbitration agreement, the agreement cannot bind the EEOC,
and, moreover, “the proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the
agency to relinquish its statutory authority if it has not agreed to do so”).
80. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 133 (Cal. 2014)
(“[PAGA] authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on
behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations
committed against the employee and fellow employees, with most of the
proceeds of that litigation going to the state.”).
81. None of the Justices’ opinions in Viking River address Waffle House.
If the Justices had relied on Waffle House and expressly equated private
attorney general mechanisms with actions by the State, such a ruling would
potentially influence how the Justices analyze future cases. Private attorney
general mechanisms are being used or discussed as a strategy to address
controversial matters, such as abortion, guns, banned books in libraries, the
teaching of critical race theory in classrooms, and transgender rights. See
Kimberly Kindy & Alice Crites, The Texas Abortion Ban Created A ‘Vigilante’
Loophole, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2022) (“Congress has encouraged private
enforcement of more anodyne laws. . . . Many civil rights statutes also rely on
this style of enforcement, brought by what are commonly referred to as ‘private
attorneys general.’”).
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courts,82 and such efforts have been strongly supported by
business interests such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.83
When Palpatine announces in Revenge of the Sith that the
Republic would be reorganized as an all-powerful Empire with
an absolute sovereign, for the sake of a stable, safe, and
prosperous society, the members of the Senate applauded.84 But
Padme observes, “So this is how liberty dies, with thunderous
applause . . . ”85 Like Padme, we should be on the lookout for
preserving democratic institutions, such as access to our public
courts and juries, and for decades, the Court has unfortunately
construed the FAA in an overly expansive, flawed manner that
overrides state sovereignty and undermines access to courts.86
V.

CONTINUED LITIGATION ABOUT VIKING RIVER: “DIFFICULT
TO SEE; ALWAYS IN MOTION IS THE FUTURE”87

Section IV of the Viking River majority decision is likely to
produce litigation going forward. First, employers may try to
argue that Section IV, particularly its finding that PAGA
representative claims can remain in court, is mere dicta. Recall
that Justice Barrett, Justice Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice
Roberts did not join Section IV, and instead, these Justices
characterized Section IV as “unnecessary to the result,” and
“much of it addresses disputed state-law questions as well as
arguments not pressed or passed upon in this case.”88 If the
findings of Section IV are not necessary for the result, there is a

82. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (asserting that
“the FAA supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another
forum,” including a special administrative tribunal carefully designed by a
state to enforce state-created rights).
83. “A top priority for the [Chamber’s] Litigation Center remains
protecting the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, including
those that waive the availability of class actions and similar representative
litigation.” Arbitration, https://perma.cc/8L7F-MLCH (last visited Oct. 21,
2022).
84. STAR WARS: EPISODE III - REVENGE OF THE SITH (Lucasfilm 2005).
85. Id. (quoting Padme).
86. Supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.
87. STAR WARS: EPISODE V - THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980)
(quoting Yoda).
88. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1926 (2022)
(Barrett, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Sith sense that employers will likely flood California courts with
arguments that the statements in Section IV are dicta.89
Although five Justices joined Section IV of the opinion, one of
whom was Justice Breyer, Justice Breyer will no longer serve on
the Court after this term.90 Thus, assuming the statements in
Section IV are dicta, it is not clear whether there would be a
majority of five Justices who would adopt Section IV’s
arguments as binding down the road. Although always in
motion is the future, there will likely be continued litigation in
California courts as to whether the FAA preempts enforcement
of a representative PAGA claim belonging to the State.

89.

See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1949)

The courts of the land have many times defined the
terms “obiter dicta” and “dicta” as “language
unnecessary to a decision,” “ruling on an issue not
raised,” or “opinion of a judge which does not embody
the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument or full consideration of the point.”
It is not clear whether the statements about the representative claims in
Section IV are dicta. The majority’s opinion involved two sets of claims, the
individual claims and the representative claims, and the state courts had
treated these two sets of claims as inseparable. See Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at
1916 (“The trial court denied that motion, and the California Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to
state policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable individual
claims and nonarbitrable ‘representative” claims.’”). The majority held that
under the FAA, these two sets of claims must be separated, and only the
individual claims had to be sent to arbitration. See id. at 1925 (stating that
the former employer “was entitled to enforce the [arbitration] agreement
insofar as it mandated arbitration of [the former employee’s] individual PAGA
claim” but that the former employee “lack[ed] statutory standing to continue
to maintain her non-individual claims in court”). In dividing the claims and
not compelling arbitration of the representative claims, the majority
necessarily held that the representative claims are not subject to arbitration
under the FAA. See id. at 1925–26. On the other hand, the State was not a
party to this proceeding before the Court, except by virtue of Ms. Moriana as
a bounty hunter, and one may argue that the disposition of the State’s claims
was not necessary to resolve Ms. Moriana’s individual claim. In other words,
the majority could have ruled on Ms. Moriana’s individual claim while at the
same time recognizing that the applicability of the FAA to State’s claims
brought by a bounty hunter remains an undecided issue.
90. Adam Liptak, Justice Breyer to Retire from Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2022), https://perma.cc/D35N-QPMY.
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In Section IV, Justice Alito construes California law as
requiring dismissal of the remaining representative claims,91
but Justice Sotomayor, in her separate, concurring opinion,
acknowledges the possibility that Justice Alito may be
misunderstanding California law.92 And Holy Sith, it appears
that Justice Alito did misconstrue California law! Justice Alito
treats the worker Ms. Moriana as lacking statutory standing
under California law to prosecute the non-individual PAGA
claims as a proxy for the State. Section IV of the opinion says
that “[w]hen an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a
PAGA action, . . . PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain
suit,”93 and Justice Alito immediately cites as support the
California Supreme Court decision in Kim v. Reins International
California, Inc.94 However, if one reads Kim more closely, the
California Supreme Court actually allows a worker to proceed
with representative PAGA claims, even though the worker’s
individual claims were already settled.95 The Kim case, instead
of supporting Justice Alito’s conclusion that no one is left here
to prosecute the representative claims, actually undermines
Justice Alito’s conclusion. Although the Kim case involves a
settlement of a worker’s individual claims, the California
Supreme Court also recognized that a worker can bring a
representative action under PAGA as a proxy for the State
without simultaneously asserting an individual claim:
This provision [of PAGA] expressly authorizes PAGA suits
brought “separately” from individual claims for relief.
(§ 2699, subd. (g)(1).) Indeed, many PAGA actions consist of
a single cause of action seeking civil penalties. . . . Standing
for these PAGA-only cases cannot be dependent on the
91. See Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1925 (asserting that under California
Labor Code, a “plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action
only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action”).
92. See id. at 1925–26 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]f this Court’s
understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case,
will have the last word. Alternatively, if this Court’s understanding is right,
the California Legislature is free to modify the scope of statutory standing
under PAGA within state and federal constitutional limits.”).
93. Viking River, 142 S. Ct. at 1925.
94. 459 P.3d 1123 (Cal. 2020).
95. Id. at 1126 (“Settlement of individual claims does not strip an
aggrieved employee of standing, as the state’s authorized representative, to
pursue PAGA remedies.”).
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maintenance of an individual claim because individual relief
has not been sought.96

In Kim, the California Supreme Court already directly
addressed the issue of standing to bring a representative PAGA
claim.97 The very case cited by Justice Alito, instead of justifying
a dismissal of the remaining PAGA claims, justifies keeping the
PAGA claims in court. This oversight by Justice Alito is
unfortunate and will lead to litigation where some employers
will inevitably argue that the representative PAGA claims must
be dismissed.98 According to Kim, aggrieved workers do not lose
standing to bring representative PAGA claims just because the
worker’s individual claim was dismissed through a contractual
settlement.99 Similarly, if a worker’s individual claim is
dismissed and resolved through contractual arbitration (and
some courts have compared an arbitral award to a contractual
settlement),100 Kim’s reasoning suggests that such a worker can
still prosecute the representative claims on behalf of the State.
After the Court issued its ruling in Viking River, Ms.
Moriana’s counsel petitioned the Court for a rehearing.101 One
ground for the rehearing involved the majority’s flawed
conclusions regarding the standing issue under California law,
but the Court denied Ms. Moriana’s petition.102 There will be
continued litigation in California about standing to pursue the
representative claims.103
96. Id. at 1132.
97. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
98. Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C., No. 221CV00087TLNJDP,
2022 WL 4387796, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2022) (citing conflicting California
cases in the wake of Viking River regarding standing to bring representative
PAGA claims).
99. See Kim, 459 P.3d at 1126 (“Settlement of individual claims does not
strip an aggrieved employee of standing, as the state’s authorized
representative, to pursue PAGA remedies.”).
100. See, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580
(7th Cir. 2001) (comparing arbitration awards to the types of “settlement[s]
businesses reach all the time”).
101. Petition for Rehearing, Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, No.
20-1573 (July 6, 2022).
102. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, No. 20-1573, 2022 WL 3580311,
at *1 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2022).
103. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1925 (2022);
supra note 98.
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CONCLUSION: A NEW HOPE

In a moving scene at the end of Rogue One, a surprise
character (who shall rename nameless to avoid spoiling one of
the most iconic moments in the Star Wars canon) says, “What is
it they’ve sent us? Hope.”104 Arbitration, although it has
potential benefits, has unfortunately been abused over the last
few decades to limit the rights of workers and consumers, to
suppress claims, conceal wrongdoing, and eliminate class action
liability.105 The Viking River case, particularly Section IV of the
majority opinion, and California’s Boba Fett law represent a
glimmer of hope for workers to seek some type of collective
redress of labor code violations through the collection of civil
penalties on behalf of the state. However, the Empire’s business
interests will attempt to extinguish this hope with aggressive
litigation and flawed arguments about the preemptive powers of
the Death Star FAA. Other states, and maybe even the federal
government,106 will hopefully use California’s efforts as a
Stardust blueprint to protect vulnerable workers and
consumers. As Jyn Erso powerfully declares in Rogue One, “We
have hope. Rebellions are built on hope!”107

104. ROGUE ONE: A STAR WARS STORY (Lucasfilm 2016).
105. See Szalai, supra note 75, at 135 (“On a day to day basis as I read
cases compelling consumers and employees to arbitrate, I can cynically view
arbitration as a means not to resolve disputes in good faith, but as an attempt
to suppress claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”).
106. At the federal level, landmark legislation was recently enacted to
protect survivors of sexual harassment and sexual assault from forced
arbitration. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).
107. ROGUE ONE: A STAR WARS STORY (Lucasfilm 2016) (quoting Jyn Erso).

